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A TORT STATUTE, WITH ALIENS AND PIRATES
Eugene Kontorovich*
The pirates of the Caribbean are back—not in another fantastical film,
but in the litigation over the reach of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). For the
first time since a wave of maritime predation in the Caribbean in the early
nineteenth century, Supreme Court justices are seriously discussing the
legal issues surrounding piracy. The crime has emerged as the test case for
evaluating the major controversies about the reach of the ATS—namely,
extraterritorial application and the existence of corporate liability. At oral
argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., justices of all
persuasions invoked piracy as a paradigm or precedent,1 as had the lower
courts before them.2 When the Court surprisingly delayed its decision, and
instead called for new briefing and argument on the extraterritorial scope of
the statute, it became even clearer that the battle over the ATS would be a
naval engagement;3 indeed, the briefs of the plaintiffs and numerous amici
repeatedly refer to piracy as a paradigm.4
This Article examines the questions before the Court in Kiobel: the
relevance of “piracies”—in the Constitution and at sea—to
extraterritoriality and corporate liability under the ATS. Much of the
discussion of piracy law in ATS cases has been inaccurate or incomplete.5
Furthermore, the new attention to piracy should—but as yet has not—direct
attention to pirates’ very own constitutional provision, the Define and
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. argued Feb. 28, 2012) (Justice Breyer citing piracy as precedent for corporate liability) (link); id.
at 21 (Chief Justice Roberts citing piracy as precedent against corporate liability).
2
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J. dissenting)
(suggesting absurdity in the idea that pirates could avoid civil liability through incorporation) (link);
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, reh’g denied, 642 F.3d 268, 270–71 (2011) (using piracy as precedent for noncorporate remedies under the ATS) (link); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (using piracy as precedent to demonstrate the extraterritorial applicability of the ATS)
(link); id. at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (using piracy as a precedent to demonstrate that the ATS does
not apply to torts occurring in other sovereign states).
3
Coincidentally, this newfound relevance of piracy comes as federal courts struggle with the first
criminal prosecutions of the offense in centuries. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir.
2012) (link).
4
See, e.g., Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief at 35, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (link).
5
In a particularly egregious example, the Ninth Circuit said that the ATS drafters may have had the
Barbary Pirates in mind. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 745. Yet those sea raiders were never thought to be
actual pirates in violation of international law, as they acted under sovereign authority. They were never
prosecuted for piracy, but rather treated as military enemies. They were described as “pirates” only as an
insulting popular idiom.
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Punish Clause,6 which contains implicit limits on extraterritorial and, in
particular, universal jurisdiction over international offenses.
Part I argues that the Constitution’s treatment of piracy limits one form
of extraterritoriality, universal jurisdiction (so called “foreign-cubed” suits),
to offenses, like piracy, that have been established as universally cognizable
by the law of nations. It does not, however, allow Congress to extend
universal jurisdiction to the many international offenses that have not risen
to universal jurisdiction status in international law. Part II turns from
constitutional limits to statutory interpretation and the applicability of
presumptions against extraterritoriality. Supreme Court piracy cases show
that even for universally cognizable offenses, Congress must explicitly
indicate that it wishes to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction. Statutory
references to international law do not make the presumption against
extraterritoriality disappear. Part III examines what piracy law teaches
about corporate liability, concluding that the civil remedies available
against pirates make the piracy example inapposite to ATS corporate
liability. Part IV briefly concludes.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAXIMUM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A. A Middle Ground on Extraterritoriality
The litigation and accompanying academic debate over the meaning
and scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been a marvel of surprising
ideological transpositions. It is usually liberals who support reading
international principles into domestic law, while conservatives disfavor
such importation. But on the issue of corporate liability—to generalize
broadly—liberals have urged the Court to look to U.S. common law while
suddenly cosmopolitan conservatives have favored the adoption of a rule
from international law and practice. The game of jurisprudential Twister
does not stop there. On the question of extraterritoriality, liberals tend to
look to international law—which is home to the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction—and conservatives tend to invoke the parochial presumption
against extraterritoriality. Neither position is fully correct. There may be a
place for extraterritoriality in ATS cases, but only in a much narrower class
of cases than where it is currently applied.7

6

See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (link).
See also Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019,
1080–91 (2011) (arguing that because international law supplies the rules of decision in ATS cases, the
statute can apply extraterritorially when international law authorizes universal jurisdiction) (link);
Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation,
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 272–75 (2009) (arguing that courts in ATS cases have improperly ignored
whether the suits would fall under universal jurisdiction in international law) (link).
7
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101

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

As this Part will show, what is at stake ATS in cases like Kiobel is not
simple extraterritoriality, but full universality, a kind of extraterritoriality on
stilts. Answering Kiobel’s territoriality question requires consideration of
Congress’s power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies on the high
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,”8 the constitutional basis for
the ATS (and for law treating piracy) as currently construed by the courts.
As will be shown, this clause suggests that the Constitution only gives
Congress the power to extend universal jurisdiction to things that clearly
have that status in international law.
B. Universality, Not Mere Extraterritoriality
The issue of ATS’s geographic scope is widely described as one of
extraterritoriality. Yet Kiobel is not about mere extraterritoriality. Even the
most controversial and aggressive uses of extraterritoriality typically
involve the regulation of American conduct abroad, or of foreign conduct
that has substantial, targeted effects in the U.S.9 As a constitutional matter,
Congress can always fall back on its Foreign Commerce power10 for
authority to make such laws. ATS cases like Kiobel, however, involve suits
by foreigners against foreigners for conduct that took place entirely abroad
and has no particular effect on the U.S.11 For U.S. courts to assert
jurisdiction over these “foreign-cubed”12 suits thus calls for an extreme
version of extraterritoriality: universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction
poses much greater problems than mere extraterritoriality; it raises the
question of where the federal government—supposedly one of limited
powers—gets the authority to regulate conduct with no domestic nexus,
with federal courts sitting as little “world courts.”
C. Universal Jurisdiction as a Constitutional Question
1. Piracies vs. Other “Offenses”
As noted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,13 the last case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the Alien Tort Statute, Founding era common law
incorporated three “international offenses”piracy, assaults on
ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Piracy occurs, by definition,
8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. (link).
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying the Sherman
Antitrust Act to foreign conduct with expected domestic effects) (link).
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (link).
12
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 794 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008)
(describing the first “foreign-cubed” securities class action to reach the Second Circuit) (link).
13
542 U.S. 692 (2004) (link).
9
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on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. Thus, Sosa reasoned,
the First Congress must have assumed the ATS would provide a cause of
action at least for those offenses. Moreover, the Court held, contemporary
international law violations of similar stature could also be brought under
the statute. Because piracy by definition took place outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, proponents of foreign-cubed ATS suits argue that
Sosa’s citing piracy as a paradigm ATS cause of action demonstrates that
the statute applies extraterritorially.
This argument draws the wrong inferences from piracy’s inclusion in
the list of domestically cognizable international law offenses in the
Founding Era. Piracy differed in significant ways from the other two
offenses mentioned in Sosa, which limits its relevance in the ATS context.
Piracy was not simply a violation of the law of nations. It was also—unlike
the other two international wrongs mentioned Sosa—a universally
cognizable offense.14 This was crucial to both its constitutional and its
statutory treatment. Yet ATS cases try to extend this precedent to nonuniversal jurisdiction cases.
In addition, the difference in the international legal status of piracy and
the other two offenses is reflected and cemented in Article I. The ATS is
generally thought to draw on the power to “define and punish . . . Offences
against the law of nations.”15 Yet ATS actions for piracy (of which there are
none on record) would presumably involve the companion power, in the
same clause, to define and punish “piracies . . . on the high seas.”16 Thus,
whatever is jurisdictionally true of “piracy” need not be true of other
“Offenses” that can be reached under the ATS: they derive from separate—
though related—Article I powers.
Piracy is both a high seas felony and an offense against the law of
nations. The Constitution’s singling out of piracy is striking and demands
explanation because it creates a double-redundancy with the subsequent
terms. Does anything make piracy different from other high seas felonies
and international law offenses? Yes: piracy was the only universally
cognizable offense at the Founding. Starting with this textual observation,
prior scholarship has explained that “piracy” is singled out because of its
singular feature—its jurisdictional consequences. Congress could punish
piracy universally, but such power did not extend to other “Offenses.” At
most, the Constitution only permits universal jurisdiction over other
universally cognizable offenses in international law.17
Thus, the same provisions that empowers Congress to selectively
implement customary international law also limits such legislation by
14

See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
16
Id.
17
See Dire, 680 F.3d at 454–55 (citing Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and
the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 149, 164–67 (2009) (link)).
15
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customary international law. There is evidence for this not just in the
structure of the clause, but also in grand jury instructions of Justices Wilson
and Story, the pronouncements of Chief Justice John Marshall, and
important judicial and Congressional precedents from the early Republic.
For example, in United States v. Furlong, the Supreme Court in 1820 found
that a statute that purported to punish “murder” by “any person” on the high
seas did not apply universally because it was not a universal jurisdiction
crime.18
Because murder was not universally cognizable, such an “offence
committed by a foreigner upon a foreigner in a foreign ship” is a matter in
which “Congress . . . ha[s] no right to interfere.”19 The Court suggested this
limitation was constitutional, noting that universal jurisdiction would
exceed “the punishing powers of the body that enacted it”20—that is, the
regulation would go beyond the Define and Punish Clause. As John
Marshall put it in on the House floor in 1800: “[T]he people of the United
States have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a foreign ship
against a foreign nation. Of consequence, in framing a Government for
themselves, they cannot have passed this jurisdiction to that Government.”21
The presumption against extraterritoriality is normally a matter of
reconstructing legislative intent. But when extraterritoriality rises to the
level of universality, it raises constitutional questions about Congress’s
power to regulate such conduct in the first place. Drawing on another
canon—constitutional avoidance—universal jurisdiction should not be
exercised except over the mostly clearly established universal jurisdiction
offenses.
This is particularly true in ATS cases, where Congress has failed to
exercise its power to “define.” That word was included in the Constitution
because international law was thought to be too “vague and deficient” to
provide a judicially administrable rule.22 In other words, not only is it often
hard to determine what international law is, but it can also come down to a
political judgment. Flesh must be put on the bones of international law
before it can be the basis for liability in American courts. In the ATS,
Congress passed the job given to it by the Constitution to the courts.
2. Promiscuous Universal Jurisdiction in the ATS
U.S. courts cannot get creative in defining the contours of international
offenses. Congress does not have unlimited license to “define” offenses
18
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) (link); see also Kontorovich, supra note 17, at 174—83
(discussing and documenting early views of Justices Wilson, Story, and Marshall).
19
Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197, 198.
20
Id. at 196.
21
United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 865 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (link).
22
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 614–15 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(link).
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beyond what international law has established. When Congress delegates
this power to the courts, the latter have even less latitude for creativity lest
they raise non-delegation concerns.23 Thus, courts must stick very closely to
well-established international precedents.24 The Supreme Court recently
made this point in the war crimes context.25 Yet in the ATS context, courts
typically apply universal jurisdiction (UJ) without any examination of
whether the relevant conduct is treated as universally cognizable by the law
of nations. The list of universal jurisdiction offenses that is generally agreed
upon is quite short, and therefore should be easy to check. Thus, The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
concludes that, even with the “expanding class of universal offenses,” that
status only attaches to “piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, [and] war crimes.”26 Another oft-cited enumeration, The
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, also add crimes against
peace, crimes against humanity, and torture.27
Yet courts in ATS cases have extended UJ to norms that are not
generally regarded as universally cognizable, such as apartheid,28 wartime
property confiscation,29 forced labor,30 and child labor.31 These cases do not
even make token efforts to establish that the norms were subject to
universal jurisdiction, and often make no distinction between American and
foreign co-defendants. The piracy precedent, for all it is worth, does not
justify, and indeed contradicts, such across-the-board universal
extraterritoriality—instead, piracy only supports universality for offenses
that have clearly achieved that status in international law. Courts have been
delegated the power to “define” international law in ATS cases, but this
definition cannot be inconsistent with, or in anticipation of, well-established
international law.32
23
Congressional delegations must be cabined by some “intelligible principle” which by definition is
narrower than Congress’s Article I power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1928) (link).
24
See Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of
Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
25
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611–12 (2006) (plurality opinion) (holding that “conspiracy”
to commit war crimes is not a violation of international law and thus could not be punished under
commissions convened under the Offenses Clause) (link).
26
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (link).
27
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) (link).
28
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (dicta); In re S. African Apartheid
Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (link); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 404,
reporter’s note 1 (noting that a treaty to assign UJ status to apartheid has not received the assent of most
nations, including the U.S.).
29
See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (link).
30
See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (link).
31
See id. at 1075.
32
See Kontorovich, supra note 24.
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Justice Ginsburg has suggested that Sosa approved extraterritoriality
by favorably citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a universal jurisdiction case.33
Indeed, Sosa quoted Filartiga’s famous analogy between modern human
rights universal jurisdiction and its precursors: “[T]he torturer has
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind.”34 Yet, this is hardly decisive. Again,
Sosa was not a universal jurisdiction case, so the issue was not before the
Court. Moreover, it could be that the ATS allows universal jurisdiction for a
few norms like torture that are generally considered to have that status in
international law, but not for others.
II. PIRATICAL PRESUMPTIONS
A. The Exceptionality of Piracy
ATS cases like Kiobel involve entirely foreign conduct and thus, put
into play the canon of statutory construction against extraterritorial
application.35 The Supreme Court recently reasserted this presumption with
respect to other statutes in the face of decades of contrary lower court
practice.36 However, the presumption is not absolute. Thus, some courts
have argued that if there was ever a place for not applying the canon, it
would be in a statute about the “law of nations.” Piracy was an offense that
by definition could only take place outside the territory of the U.S. Since
piracy is presumably actionable under the ATS, some courts have reasoned
that the extraterritoriality canon is inapplicable.37
Again, cases like Kiobel raise issues not just of extraterritoriality but of
universality. Universal jurisdiction cases go far beyond what is implicated
by the standard territoriality presumption because the latter doctrine applies
to statutes designed to regulate American interests. Thus, even if one thinks
statutes concerning international law could be more easily found to apply

33

See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
35
Though often traced to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37
(1812) (link), that case turned largely on principles of international law. The longstanding modern canon
appears to be independent from the Schooner Exchange rule and is not concerned with potential
conflicts with foreign laws. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878–939 (2010).
36
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–939.
37
See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Exxon posits a novel form of
the canon, for it appears beyond debate that piracy is contemplated by the ATS, and piracy can occur
outside of the territorial bounds of the United States.” (citations omitted)) (link); id. at 78 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority on this point). Judge Kavanaugh attempts to distinguish high seas
extraterritoriality from “foreign country” extraterritoriality. But since vessels on the high seas fall within
the jurisdiction of their flag state, adjudicating crimes on foreign vessels raises the same issues of
interference with other countries as crimes within foreign borders.
34
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extraterritorially, reading universal jurisdiction into a statute is another
matter altogether.38
Moreover, it is not clear that Sosa was right about Congress’s belief
that the ATS would be a vehicle for piracy suits. Although piracy was one
of the three offenses incorporated into common law, it stood on very
different remedial footing than the other two. Civil remedies against pirates
were almost exclusively in rem. While damages actions were possible, it is
hard to find any evidence of such suits, and they would likely have been far
too marginal to command Congress’s solicitude. Moreover, piracy by a
U.S. vessel would, in an important sense, not be extraterritorial because a
ship on the high seas is fully within the territorial jurisdiction of its flag
state. Finally, while piracy took place by definition outside the borders of
the U.S., violations of safe conduct, another of the ATS’s three historical
paradigms, were by definition strictly territorial. It is hard to see why one
would model ATS territoriality on the former and not the latter, especially
for causes of action that do not necessarily arise extraterritorially. Piracy
was understood as a unique offense in international law when the ATS was
passed. Even if the ATS applied to it, this demonstrates that Congress
would want to discard extraterritoriality presumptions for other offenses.
B. Presumption Still Applies to International Crimes
The fact that a statute deals with matters of international law does not
mean it automatically triggers universal jurisdiction or suspends
presumptions against extraterritoriality. For example, in United States v.
Palmer, Chief Justice Marshall read a statute criminalizing “piracy” by
“any person” as requiring a U.S. nexus, even though it was clear that
Congress could constitutionally apply the statute universally.39 To be sure,
Congress quickly overrode the Palmer construction, at least partially, and
Justice Marshall appears to have gotten it wrong as a matter of
congressional intent (though not necessarily as a textual matter).40 Yet
Congress’s response to Palmer does not disprove the existence of the
presumption as applied to international law offenses. Presumptions are
generalizations about congressional intent. Those generalizations are, of
course, sometimes wrong, and in those cases Congress can say so.
A presumption is only valuable if it is usually right. The antiextraterritoriality rule stops making sense if one thinks that by invoking
international law terms, or at least universal jurisdiction offenses, Congress
usually intends to use the full extent of the jurisdiction allowed to it by
38

Federal courts have found universal extraterritoriality only in the face of the clearest statement of
congressional intent. See, e.g., Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. § 70503(b)
(2012) (link).
39
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 610 (1818) (link).
40
See Colangelo, supra note 7, at 1063–65.
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international law.41 Congress’s critical reaction to Palmer aside, the
evidence goes in the opposite direction. Recent federal statutes do not
extend universal jurisdiction to war crimes but do apply it to torture (in both
cases making the foreign application clear) though both are universal
jurisdiction offenses in international law.42 Indeed, in the 1820s, the Navy
Department was instructing warships to only interfere with pirates attacking
U.S. ships.43 Today, the stated policy of almost all nations, including the
U.S., is to avoid any exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy.44 Indeed,
most nations do not have laws against most universal jurisdiction offenses
(leaving aside the question of civil remedies). In short, the universal
cognoscibility of an offense is relevant to Congress’s constitutional ability
to regulate it but not necessarily relevant to whether that power has been
maximally exercised.
The ATS was passed by the very same Congress that authored the
piracy law at issue in Palmer. If the presumption applied to an anti-piracy
law, one would think a court would apply it equally to sister statutes dealing
with law of nations violations. On the other hand, if presumptions have
validity because Congress knowingly treats them as background rules,45
they would have less bite with the legislation of the First Congress, which
had not yet considered the presumption.
Justice Ginsburg has suggested that the Supreme Court implicitly
approved of ATS extraterritoriality in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.46 But Sosa
involved “simple” extraterritoriality—and did not raise foreign-cubed
issues—because it involved U.S. federal agents and their local contractors
abducting a Mexican national (who had been involved in the torture and
murder of a U.S. federal agent) so that he could stand trial in the U.S. Few
cases could have a tighter U.S. nexus.
Reading a U.S. territorial or other nexus requirement into the statute is
consistent with its purpose. The statute was designed to give an avenue of
redress to aliens aggrieved by law of nations violations for which the U.S.
might be held responsible by foreign powers. The ATS’s reference to
international law does not untether it from American interests. Consider by
analogy Article III’s Ambassadors Clause.47 This clause provides that the
41

See id. at 1074–75.
See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (link).
43
One might think different presumptions should apply to criminal and civil statutes. In the case of
pirates, for example, civil remedies against foreign pirates would only be available after the Executive
had decided to engage in enforcement action.
44
See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for
Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 326 (2010) (link).
45
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (“[T]he
presumption . . . preserv[es] a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable
effects.”).
46
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 12–13.
47
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
42

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/13/

108

107:100 (2012)

A Tort Statute, with Aliens and Pirates

Supreme Court will have original jurisdiction over suits involving
ambassadors and does not textually limit the class of ambassadors involved.
Yet when a U.S. Ambassador—that is, an emissary from Washington—
sought a trial before the Court, he was dismissed out of hand in one short
paragraph.48 The Ambassadors Clause (or perhaps just the similarly worded
statute conferring the jurisdiction) only applies to foreign ambassadors
because that is the purpose of the jurisdiction: to avoid offending other
countries.49
One might suggest that the policies behind the anti-extraterritorial
presumption, such as avoiding conflicts with foreign laws, do not apply to
the ATS. Under the ATS, it is international law that is to be applied. This is
the same everywhere—what can be the conflict? First, the definition of
international law is “vague,” varying from one nation to another; this is why
the Framers made Congress “define” it. To pretend that different national
conceptions of international law cannot conflict comes close to the
discarded pretense that the several states apply a single common law, with
perceived conflicts being a mere epiphenomenon.50 Second, international
law is silent as to the method of its enforcement, particularly on the
question of penalties. With the exception of the U.S., no country has civil
remedies for extraterritorial torts, and several have filed briefs protesting
such litigation under the ATS. Certainly the punitive damages conflict with
other legal regimes comes not just from penalizing what they choose to
legalize but also from penalizing to different degrees. Different degrees of
penalty can create substantive inconsistency, as the Supreme Court recently
noted in ruling on federal preemption of Arizona’s immigration laws.51 In a
further irony, the Kiobel plaintiffs argue that ATS cases should not be
governed purely by international law but that the Court should borrow
important rules of decision—such as corporate liability—from U.S.
domestic law.
Palmer may reflect a presumption distinct from but related to the
extraterritoriality one: a presumption against universality. The assumption
is that Congress legislates selfishly, to vindicate parochial American
interests, rather than for the sake of cosmopolitan justice. This approach is
well illustrated by directives issued by Secretary of the Navy Smith
Thompson in 1823 to a naval squadron sent to the Caribbean to suppress
what turned out to be the last great wave of international piracy in the Age
of Sail:
From the generality of [the statute], it would seem to
embrace those of every nation or country upon which any
48

See Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302 (1925) (link).
Id. at 303.
50
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (link).
51
See Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, slip op. at 12–15 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (holding that
“additional penalties” for violation of same substantive law creates direct conflict) (link).
49
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piratical aggressions may have been committed. Admitting
the act might be extended this far, it does not appear to
have been the general object of the law; and it is thought by
the President most advisable, at present, not to give it a like
indiscriminate practical construction as to all vessels. The
great object [of the statute] . . . was to protect the merchant
vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical
aggressions . . . .
If, however, you shall discover depredations upon other
vessels, committed under such gross and aggravated
circumstances, as to leave little doubt of the piratical
character, it will be your duty to capture and bring in the
aggressors . . . . No authority is given to retake the vessels
of any foreign nation.52
These instructions refer to the piracy statute after Congress had
amended it to allow for universal jurisdiction, in response to the Supreme
Court’s Palmer decision. Yet the Executive effectively rules out universal
jurisdiction. The instructions suggest several important points for the ATS.
First, universal jurisdiction, even for piracy, was regarded as extraordinary,
and those interpreting the statute continued to apply a narrow construction
based on the basic principle that U.S. laws are primarily concerned with
U.S. interests. Obviously, one can quibble about the interpretive value of
naval orders. But these were self-conscious, executive interpretations of a
statute, authored by a cabinet secretary (and subsequently a Justice on the
Supreme Court)—Smith Thompson. The case for extraterritorial application
of the ATS places extraordinary weight on a single sentence in a
memorandum by the Attorney General. Together, the two executive branch
interpretations point the same way—a requirement of some U.S. nexus.
The orders do suggest that under “aggravated circumstances” universal
jurisdiction could be exercised for crimes that undoubtedly had that status
under international law, though the instructions are ambiguous on this point
(and could also be read to forbid the capture of pirates attacking foreign
ships from non-U.S. vessels, which would rule out all universal
jurisdiction). At a minimum, the Executive raised the bar significantly
beyond what was required in international law. Indeed, the instructions
show that the Executive played a crucial gate-keeping role in universal
jurisdiction over piracy. Because even civil remedies against pirates were in
rem, they could only be enjoyed in the rare cases where the Executive had
authorized a capture and decided to bring the vessel in for adjudication (for

52
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reasons of convenience, they were often burned at sea or turned over to
local authorities).
III. PIRATES, INC.
While corporations can routinely be held liable under U.S. domestic
law, it is far from clear that the law of nations creates similar liability.
Indeed, it is hard to identify any cases in which corporations have been held
liable for violating the law of nations outside the ATS context. Because
pirates were engaged in a multi-person profit-making enterprise—a
business of sorts—piracy has been invoked as a precedent for corporate
liability in international law and, given Sosa, one that should be near and
dear to the ATS.53
Yet, while piracy law does not disprove the possibility of corporate
liability, neither is it an example or precedent for its existence, even by way
of analogy. First, the civil remedy against pirates was the condemnation of
their vessel, an in rem proceeding in admiralty. Second, the pirates were not
a share corporation. Typically, pirates owned their vessel jointly. The
organization of a pirate vessel was essentially a partnership—with elected
officers—rather than a share corporation. There was no separation of
ownership from control, the central characteristic of the modern public
corporation.54 Consequently, the condemnation of the vessel simply
operated as a fine against the principals, those who had directly violated
international law. Modern corporate liability, by contrast, seeks to impose
costs on diffuse absentee shareholders, who do not exercise direct control
over the international law violations of their corporate agents. In rem
proceedings against pirates, therefore, were more analogous to in personam
actions against corporate directors or officers responsible for the tort than
against their employer.
The in rem nature of the proceedings is crucial. The purpose of such a
proceeding was primarily to determine the legal rights in the vessel, not to
provide compensation to victims of piracy. Thus, if the pirates had
originally pirated the vessel they sailed on—as was often the case—the libel
would serve to restore it to its owners (minus a claim for salvage by the
captor) and nothing more. Moreover, the proceeds of a condemnation
would be used to pay the captor. In rem jurisdiction therefore was a way of
privately financing the dangerous and under-supplied service of actually
apprehending pirates. Crucially, victims of the pirates from other vessels
could not make any claim for condemnation.
Justice Breyer, Judge Leval, and others have speculated about what
would happen if pirates incorporated. Would “Pirates, Inc.” be shielded
53
54
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http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/13/

111

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

from liability? To be sure, because jurisdiction was in rem, the identity of
the owner did not matter. But ATS cases pose a different question: Could
Pirates, Inc. be pursued for damages separate from the libel of their vessel
and tort suits against individual pirates? The practice of condemning pirate
vessels does not serve as any precedent for an affirmative answer.55
The closest precedent involved a vessel that had not gone on a
premeditated piratical cruise, but nonetheless engaged in opportunistic acts
of piracy during an otherwise legitimate journey, unbeknownst to the
vessel’s owner. Justice Story found that the innocence and ignorance of the
absentee owner was no defense to the in rem condemnation of his vessel56
but also made clear that this was a particular doctrine of admiralty, not one
of tort damages.57 Indeed, the condemnation would not extend to the cargo
if its owners did not direct the piratical offense. Yet, in many ways it is the
cargo owners who are the ultimate “bosses” of the journey—they hire the
ship from an owner, who hires a master, who ultimately hires a crew.
Indeed, Justice Story suggested the immunity of the innocent cargo owners
would persist even if the master of the pirate ship was their direct agent, or
if they also owned the vessel itself.58
Justice Story made clear that the forfeiture in rem, despite the owner’s
innocence, was necessary to ensure effective compensation to victims. 59
Supporters of corporate ATS liability make arguments with a superficially
similar tone—without forfeiture in rem, victims have no remedy and
offenders no deterrence. Yet the policy behind in rem jurisdiction was not
about going after the deepest pocket. Rather, the “necessity” came from the
difficulty foreign plaintiffs faced in obtaining personal jurisdiction over
ship owners or even identifying them. Indeed, far from guaranteeing
compensation to all victims, in rem proceedings capped recovery at the
value of the vessel minus salvage and admiralty fees, leaving absent
claimants with nothing. Today, damages actions are available against the

55
By an amazing coincidence, another ATS case pending in the federal courts gives a potential
example of incorporated “pirates.” The case involves a suit by Japanese whalers against a Washingtonbased environmentalist group famous for using boats to obstruct whaling on the high seas. The whalers
said the hazardous tactics of Sea Shepherd amounted to “acts of violence or depredation” and thus
constitute piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
defendant group is incorporated as a non-profit, and there is not the kind of separation of ownership and
control found in share corporations. Illustrating the distinction from typical corporate cases, the group’s
founder and director also captains its vessels and was named as a co-defendant. The defendants have not
raised the corporate liability issue, perhaps because the plaintiffs have only sought equitable relief.
Moreover, the district court surprisingly held that Sea Shepherd’s conduct could not be piracy because it
was not committed for “private ends” as required by UNCLOS because it “is uninterested in financial
gain” and only wants to “save the . . . whales.” Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation
Soc’y, No. C11–2043RAJ, 2012 WL 958545, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2012).
56
The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844) (link).
57
Id. at 232.
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Id. at 236–37.
59
Id. at 232.
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responsible corporate officers and agents, and personal jurisdiction is much
broader.
The notion of Pirates, Inc. expresses an intuitive incredulity that
investors in pirate ventures—and these exist today—could avoid liability.
Yet this question is inapposite to ATS corporate liability in two ways. First,
such investors are, at best, only liable under international law if they
“intentionally facilitated” the actus reus of piracy.60 The requirement of
actual “intent” itself suggests a limitation of liability to individuals.
Moreover, the investors in Pirates, Inc. are acting solely with the purpose
and knowledge of funding a violation of international law. This is quite
unlike the shareholders of the multinational corporations in ATS cases. In
short, the pirate financiers are also the ringleaders; they are putting up
money specifically to commit acts of piracy.
Second, it remains entirely unclear if absentee investors in pirate
ventures, whether incorporated or not, are liable under international law.
The natural reading of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea is that it only applies to facilitators on the high seas, and not land-based
accomplices.61 To be sure, national laws have long provided criminal
punishment for land-based accomplices, but this supplements, rather than
implements, the law of nations. For example, federal piracy statutes have
long treated land-based assistance to pirates as a separate offense—
”confederating with pirates”—distinct from “piracy as defined by the law of
nations.”62 Fitting out pirates is not defined as piracy and carries a much
lighter penalty. Moreover, when national law is used to augment
international law crimes, universal jurisdiction is not available since it can
only be created by the law of nations.
It is neither odd nor perverse that the law of nations would not
necessarily reach Pirates, Inc. Captured pirates face criminal punishment,
which was death until the twentieth century, and in the U.S remains life in
prison. This is a serious deterrent and one that it is not surprising
international law has not needed to supplement. Moreover, piracy is a
universal jurisdiction offense. Universal jurisdiction is made possible by the
narrow scope of the offense—conduct on the high seas. It is not surprising
that the definition of the offense does not extend to land-based investors;
the international consensus on treating piracy as a universal offense might
well not be tenable if it included conduct purely within the sovereign
territory of a single state.

60
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(c), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, 436 (link).
61
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 86, supra note 60, at 432.
62
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1657, 1651 (2012) (link).
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CONCLUSION
Piracy is the oldest and most well-established international offense.
Thus, it is not surprising that questions about the extraterritorial scope and
availability of corporate liability under the ATS look to piracy as a
paradigm. Yet many have taken away the wrong lessons. The Constitution
does permit extraterritorial—indeed, universal—jurisdiction over piracy.
But it does not do so for all “Offenses against the Law of Nations.” Indeed,
the broader jurisdictional scope for piracy is the primary reason it is
mentioned separately in the Constitution. At most, the Constitution only
allows foreign-cubed suits for offenses that have the same international
status as piracy, but courts in ATS cases have skipped this crucial first step.
Moreover, even if one accepts Sosa’s dictum—the ATS was intended to
apply to piracy—this does not mean it was intended to extend the
constitutional maximum scope of jurisdiction. For one, other
contemporaneous piracy laws did not apply to foreign-cubed cases.
Additionally, other contemporaneous jurisdictional statutes did not confer
the constitutional maximum jurisdiction even when they echoed the
relevant constitutional language.
Nor does the international legal status of piracy provide a precedent for
the liability of modern share corporations. Pirate syndicates were
partnerships with no separation of ownership and control. In rem
condemnation of a vessel is different in crucial ways from money damages,
perhaps most significantly in the inherent limitation of the extent of
liability.

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/13/

114

